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RESUMO 
Este artigo pretende analisar e comparar a historiografia sobre a 
história do petróleo do Brasil e da Argentina, dando ênfase as 
características políticas de ambos os países e como elas moldaram 
seu desenvolvimento energético e econômico. Este artigo também 
pretende perceber de que forma a nova historiografia pode contribuir 
para a compreensão da economia política do petróleo nos dois países 
e quais oportunidades ela oferece para novos pesquisadores na área. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to analyze and compare the main historiography 
about Brazil and Argentina oil history, giving emphasis on how political 
features of both countries shaped its energetic and economic 
development. This paper also intends to perceive in which ways new 
historiography can contribute to the understanding of the political 
economy of oil in both countries and which opportunities it offers for 
new researchers in that area. 
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 The historiography of oil and nationalism in Latin America 
tends to focus on Mexico and Venezuela, as these countries are the 
two major producers in the region. This preference is 
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understandable, but leaves aside other crucial facets of oil and 
power in Latin America. Brazil and Argentina are two of the major 
economies in the Americas and important oil markets in the 
continent. Their growing domestic industrialization fostered an 
increasing demand for oil, which by its turn made evident that both 
countries were dependent on foreign oil, exacerbating the limitations 
of their developmental strategies. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, Brazil and Argentina went through similar processes of 
political-economic development, starting with classic liberal 
republics, moving through populism, military conservatism and finally 
the neoliberal age. During all those historical twists and turns, oil has 
been a major part of the public life, social imagination and 
government strategy.  
The state oil companies of Brazil and Argentina, Petrobras 
and Yaciemientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) became the 
embodiment of dreams of self-development and national power. It 
can be argued that these same trends can be seen in other places, 
where oil and nationalism have also played a major role during the 
20th century. But in the case of Argentina and Brazil, this 
convergence was complicated by the dual conditions of these 
nations as producers, developing a state-led domestic industry, and 
consumers, heavily engaged with the major multinational oil 
corporations. Their entanglements with the majors and the need to 
develop a capital-intensive industry such as oil at a time when that 
was financially beyond their reach make them important cases in the 
global history of oil. In this light, my goal in this historiographical 
essay is to assess where scholars converge and diverge in their 
treatment of three different historical moments. Comparison and 
contrast of different perspectives on the origins, consolidation and 
maturity of Petrobras and YPF allows fuller appreciation of the 
importance of oil to the development of Brazil and Argentina, of the 
importance of Petrobras and YPF to the history of global oil, and the 
key topics for further scholarly investigation. 
 
Origins of the Oil Industry 
 
 Oil emerged as an important national theme and as an 
industry in Argentina earlier than in Brazil. Given the historical 
context, that might be considered an expected outcome. In spite of 
the fact that the Brazilian territory is much bigger than Argentina and 
that Brazil has always had a larger population, by the late nineteenth 
century the Argentine economy was developing faster than Brazil’s. 
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The full integration of the Argentine economy with that of Great 
Britain, through the trade of beef and wheat, brought impressive 
profits and easier access to British credit. As many historians have 
noted, Argentina served lunch while Brazil served dessert, explaining 
why the meat-wheat based Argentine economy was developing 
faster than the coffee-based Brazilian economy. While Brazil was still 
only running on coal, by the late nineteenth century a more 
developed Argentina already had a considerable consumption of 
Kerosene, especially for public illumination in Buenos Aires.  
Nicolas Gadano, a professor of economics and a former 
employee of YPF, explores this context in “Historia del petroleo 
argentino, 1907-1955”, 2006. His status as a YPF insider with full 
access to the company’s archives added to the extensive research 
conducted in the diplomatic documents of at least three countries, 
making his book the most thorough work available on the origins and 
consolidation on the Argentine oil industry. Gadano shows that by 
1890, oil was already a polemic issue in Argentine public life. 
(GADANO, 2006:P.15) He describes in detail how the free-trade 
oriented government of Argentina did not hesitate to offer Spanish 
companies full access rights to the Salta oil fields close to the border 
with Paraguay. But while rabid nationalists might regard this as a 
sell-out typical of oil history, Gadano treats the negotiations with 
greater nuance, emphasizing Argentina’s delicate position regarding 
energy issues. Argentina depended on Welsh coal for more than 
90% of its energy demands and the Argentine political elite feared 
that any disruption in transatlantic trade might cause a severe 
economic crisis. In Gadano’s interpretation, this explains the 
extremely favorable conditions given to the Spanish entrepreneurs in 
the Salta concession. (GADANO, 2006: P. 27)  
The Spanish ultimately lacked the necessary resources to fully 
develop the concession and ended up bankrupt before it could 
achieve any meaningful results. After that initial setback, the 
Argentine government sent teams of geologists to survey the 
sedimentary basins of the country in search of promising oil fields. 
On December 13th 1907, a team found a major breakthrough in the 
coastal city of Comodoro Rivadavia. The geologists found what was 
later considered to be the major oil field in Argentina at that point and 
the geologists believed that this could be the path for Argentine 
energy independence. (GADANO, 2006: P.23)  
The discovery triggered an internal political fight for the 
development rights. Carl Solberg’s classic work, “Oil and Nationalism in 
Argentina”, 1979, explores this context and its importance in the 
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foundations of the Argentine oil industry. Solberg’s work complements 
that of Gadano: where Gadano focuses more on the economic and 
technical aspects of the industry, Solberg gives greater importance to 
the political aspects of the Comodoro Rivadavia finding. Solberg argues 
that the discovery of the new fields came in a moment of political 
transition. There was a growing conflict among Argentine elites, where 
the free trade oriented PAN clashed with the UCR, a more nationalistic 
sector, albeit still part of the nation’s elite. (SOLBERG, 1979: P.22) 
President Roque Saenz Pena was instrumental not only in resolving this 
conflict, but in giving an important incentive to the birth of the Argentine 
oil industry. In challenging his Anglophile political allies, he risked 
political capital by announcing that the new oil fields would be under the 
control of the Ministry of Agriculture. The decision enraged Standard Oil, 
Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Iranian, the three majors that dominated 
the oil and kerosene market in Argentina. Solberg’s work makes key 
contributions in clarifying this decisive moment in Argentina’s oil history.  
In the excellent overview Oil and Politics in Latin America 
George Philip demonstrates that Anglo-Iranian was particularly 
disappointed with the Saenz Pena’s decision. (PHILIP, 1982:P.10) 
This confirms Solberg’s argument that Argentina was virtually an 
“economic colony” of Great Britain. The British government expected 
unlimited access to those new fields, or, at least, that Argentina 
would keep its more Liberal approach of an open market. British 
strategists, doubtful of Persia’s reliability as Britain’s preferred oil-
supplier, also hoped that Argentina—more firmly ensconced in the 
British sphere of power—would turn into a stable source of oil. As 
Philip demonstrates, Britain’s geopolitical oil strategy hinged the vital 
South Atlantic coaling station of Port Stanley. If the British 
companies had access to the new fields, Port Stanley could have 
become an even more pivotal point in the British naval strategy. 
 While each brings key insights, Gadano, Solberg and Philip 
converge in their interpretations of YPF’s origins. The Ministry of 
Agriculture proved incompetent in developing the Comodoro 
Rivadavia fields. Tough environmental conditions and terrible 
working conditions made strikes and riots a routine. The rise of the 
UCR and the president Hypólito Yrigoyen to power in 1916 promised 
change. The deepening crisis of World War I heightened the sense 
of urgency for both Britain and Argentina. War brought transatlantic 
trade to a halt, causing a severe energy crisis in Argentina. Yrigoyen 
recognized that reality, but was unable to change it during his term. 
As Solberg demonstrates, Yrigoyen’s response to the crisis was the 
creation of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) in 1922, the first 
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State oil company of the Americas, and one of the first in the world.( 
SOLBERG, 1979:P.28) The 1920s would see the consolidation of 
the company: the progress would be impressive, but some of the 
troubles that marked that initial stage endured. 
 The origins of the oil industry in Brazil can be traced to the early 
20th century, when the Brazilian government followed Argentina’s 
example and conceded exploration rights to small British entrepreneurs 
in São Paulo and Bahia. They failed to find any meaningful reserve, 
which outraged the Brazilian government. The Brazilians thought the 
British could only be cheating—it seemed impossible that a giant 
country like Brazil had no meaningful oil field. That mix of 
disappointment, mismanagement and nationalism marked the Brazilian 
oil industry from 1900 until 1953. Peter Smith’s 1979 work Oil and 
Politics in Braziland Drielli Peyerl’s book Oil of Brazil stillremain the best 
analysis of those first years. Smith demonstrates that what the Brazilian 
political elite perceived as the main advantage of the country in the end 
proved to be its greatest trouble. The Brazilian rulers believed that the 
sheer size of the country’s landmass was a huge asset, since it had 
every kind of resource in it. But that impressive landmass made the 
geologic survey for oil a herculean task. And some of the most 
promising sedimentary basins were located in places of extremely 
difficult access, like the Amazon forest. (SMITH, 1979: Pp. 7-43) The 
enormous amount of resources, coupled with the knowledge of easily 
accessible sources in Venezuela, Peru and Argentina, scared the 
majors away from Brazil. Meanwhile, Peyerl’s book is a major 
contribution to the understanding of the development of the technical 
aspects of the Brazilian oil industry. Her analysis stretches even further 
than Smith’s, starting with the very early beginnings of the oil exploration 
in Brazil, when the Emperor himself was trying to concede oil contracts 
to foreigners as early as 1868. (PEYERL, 2020: p.17) 
Getúlio Carvalho’s 1977 work Petrobras: do monopolio aos 
contratos de risco, explores the origins of Brazil’s state oil company. 
Carvalho’s work, while extensive, is limited by curtailed access to the 
company’s documents, written during the most repressive years of 
the authoritarian period of Brazil’s military regime. Smith and 
Carvalho converge on two important points, pivotal to any 
understanding of Brazil’s early oil history. The first is the rise of 
Getulio Vargas to national power and the Brazilian position within the 
global oil market. Vargas led the coup that brought down the liberal 
Old Republic in 1930. Since the coffee economy struggled during the 
Great Depression, Vargas believed that it was time to start a new 
national project orientated towards import substituting 
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industrialization. Vargas and his cohort perceived oil to be the energy 
that would fuel the future of Brazilian industrialization. Carvalho 
demonstrates that oil, nationalism and the military were tied together 
during that period. Within the military circles that supported Vargas, 
there was a mythological belief that Brazil had to become one of the 
major oil producers in the world. (CARVALHO, 1977: Pp. 45-73) 
They urged Vargas to take immediate measures to achieve that goal.  
Vargas, a master strategist, acquiesced. In 1932, he passed 
the law that nationalized all subsoil resources. Two years later he 
created the Petroleum National Council (CNP), whose task was to 
prospect and explore oil fields yet to be discovered. Typical of his 
strategy, Vargas then entrusted this Council to the military allies that 
had pressed him to nationalize oil, securing their loyalty and keeping 
them where he could monitor their actions. Until 1945, nevertheless, 
Brazil remained a secondary player both as a producer and a 
consumer. Coal and wood remained its primary sources of energy. 
The retail market for gasoline was profitable for Esso and Shell, but 
was much smaller than that Argentina. But as World War II ended 
and Brazilian industrialization soared, the demand for oil finally 
surged. As was the case with the Ministry of Agriculture in Argentina, 
Brazil’s Petroleum Council proved incapable of responding to this 
demand. Brazil needed a new institution, with technological, political 
and financial power, to develop its oil potential. Petrobras, created in 
1953, was expected to be the game changer.  
 
Consolidation of the state companies 
 
 Meanwhile, YPF had already become a colossal presence in 
Argentine life. In less than a decade YPF became a major player in 
extracting, refining and retailing Argentine oil. The official narrative treats 
Colonel Enrique Mosconi, YPF’s chief strategist, almost like a saint, a 
man who sacrificed himself for the dream of national development 
based on energy self -sufficiency. Gadano, Solberg and Philip offer 
more balanced treatment. They agree that Mosconi was a gifted 
administrator: he was able to control the strikes in the oil fields of 
Comodoro Rivadavia and Plaza Huincul. He also brought an enhanced 
sense of organization and made YPF more effective than it was in 1922. 
Under Mosconi’s leadership, YPF forged a partnership with Bethlem 
Steel at the La Plata refinery, the largest in South America. The La Plata 
refinery gave YPF the lead in refining in the South America’s largest oil-
consuming country. Solberg’s account gives much of the credit to YPF 
president Marcos Alvear. Gadano, in contrast, draws on vast archival 
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evidence to tell a different story. Gadano shows Alvear was the typical 
fruit of the Porteno Elite of the early 20th century. He was an Anglophile, 
the wealthy scion of cattle barons, a fan of horseraces and a believer in 
free trade. Alvear understood what Hypolito Yrigoyen’s gamble in 
founding YPF meant to the political survival of his party, UCR. The party 
gained the sympathy of many sectors of the Argentine society for whom 
oil and nationalism went hand in hand. In the end, Alvear gave full 
support to Mosconi, but what the president really wanted was to 
privatize YPF and open the country especially to the British majors, 
Royal Shell and Anglo Iranian (BP). The British remained keen aspirants 
to the Argentine oil concession, with or without the partnership of YPF. 
As Gadano demonstrates, Mosconi, more so than Alvear, developed 
YPF’s capacity to the degree that it could develop the Argentine fields 
largely on its own. As Philip demonstrates, this enabled YPF to satisfy 
the nationalist UCR base in congress, without plunging the nation into 
another energy crisis. (GADANO, 2006: Pp. 185-209) 
 Gadano, Philip and Solberg nevertheless agree that YPF was 
not able to transform Argentina into a self-sufficient oil country. By 
the early thirties, YPF provided only about 25% of Argentina’s oil 
needs of Argentina. Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) controlled the 
majority of supply and retailing. In order to supply the Argentine 
market, Esso brought considerable quantities of oil from Venezuela. 
Moreover, Jersey led the exploration of fields in Salta and Mendoza 
that had not been nationalized in 1907. As Solberg demonstrates, 
this concession required deft negotiation of conflicting alliances: the 
Porteño elites preferred British partners to Americans, but the 
provincial governors of Salta and Jujuy distrusted the Porteños, and 
sought the most lucrative deal possible—in this case with Standard. 
Oil thus proved crucial in the delicate political machinations between 
capital and provinces that became part of Argentina’s growing 
political tension. (SOLBERG, 1979: P.76) 
 A fragile balance among these various sectors endured 
throughout the 1920s, but became increasingly precarious by the 
end of the decade. Yrigoyen, in a second, nonconsecutive term as 
Argentina’s president, tilted more precipitously towards nationalist 
measures. In 1930, conservative military and political figures 
reacted, ousting Yrigoyen and the UCR. Gadano attributes the coup 
in large part to the machinations of Standard Jersey. (GADANO, 
2006: P.252) Solberg, in contrast, gives Standard a pass and 
attributes the coup solely to internal factors. (Solberg, 1979, P.112) 
Regardless of its origins, the coup’s results disappointed the labor 
left without appeasing the free-traders: the new President, General 
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Uriburu, reinforced YPF’s power and its scope of action. Uriburu and 
his successors used YPF to strengthen the military control over the 
state, rather than to build a loyal corps of industrial workers. In 1936, 
they decreed that all new oil fields in Argentina belonged to the 
Argentine state. In addition, they obliged Royal Shell and Esso to 
concede half of the Buenos Aires retail market of gasoline and other 
petroleum products to YPF. 
As Gadano demonstrates, this turned YPF into an important 
propaganda instrument. Even gas stations used national colors (light 
blue and white) and evoked the national theme of the gaucho. 
(GADANO, 2006: P.482) The relations between the Argentine 
government and Standard Jersey soured further when rumor spread 
alleging that Esso was smuggling and refining oil from Bolivia in the 
north in order to avoid new taxes imposed on crude oil imported by the 
majors. The regime used these rumors to strengthen its control over 
domestic production. The military regimes of the 1930s thus nurtured an 
odd combination of labor-repressive, nationalist, state-led capitalism. 
 World War II then brought renewed energy crisis, as well as 
political crisis within the Argentine regime. This crisis paved the way 
for Juan Domingo Perón’s rise to power. Perón dramatically 
improved working conditions in the oil fields and gave oil workers 
better access to retirement plans, vacation colonies and health care. 
According to Elana Shever demonstrates in “Oil And Neoliberalism in 
Argentina, ”in a strategy typical of Latin American populists, Perón 
emphasized YPF as a family, firmly hierarchical but bonded by 
emotional ties and loyalty, as well as financial interest, 
characteristics that defined the corporation until privatization in 1993. 
(SHEVER, 2012: P.43) Shever, Gadano, Philip and Solberg offer 
similar analyses of oil and Peronism. They show that Peronist rule of 
YPF was marked by corruption and mismanagement. The company 
was not able to improve its services and also failed to develop 
Argentina’s full capacity as an oil-producing nation. Oil dependence 
proved the Achilles heel of Perón’s enthusiastic import substitution 
strategy. (ISI) International oil prices rose while domestic oil demand 
grew, far outstripping domestic supply, and the machinery of ISI 
ground to a halt by the mid-1950s.  
 The ensuing period, marked by alternation of military and 
civilian governments in a series of coups and counter-coups, was 
marked by ingrained corruption, under-investment and incompetence 
within YPF. The majors, meanwhile, largely steered clear of this risky 
environment, particularly after Standard Jersey (ESSO) and 
Standard of California (CHEVRON) lost considerable investments 
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following coups in the 1950s and early 1960s. As a result, despite 
YPF’s early promise, it failed to reach its potential. Gadano’s 
assessment is persuasive: “after 40 years of YPF, Argentina was still 
only a country with oil, period.”(GADANO, 2006: P.594) 
 Back in Brazil, the oil debate raged after 1945. Getúlio Vargas 
was ousted in a coup in 1945, but then returned as elected president in 
1950, precisely when Brazil’s oil needs became desperate. As Carvalho 
demonstrates, Vargas seized the momentum of his popularity in the 
early 1950s to create a state oil company. But Carvalho gives necessary 
attention to Vargas’s insistence that the company include the 
participation of private capital: Vargas intended to solve the cash flow 
problem of the new company while avoiding a showdown with the US 
government and the majors. (CARVALHO, 1977:P.45)  
Philip demonstrates that the political opposition and an 
important part of the Brazilian conservative elite was willing to sink 
Vargas’plans by any means. (PHILIP, 1982: P.223) When the debate 
went to the Brazilian congress, the brouhaha reached epic 
proportions. In the end, the government favored a mixed national 
company and the monopoly of exploring and refining in the country. 
The opposition UDN, sacrificing its Liberal roots to the nationalist 
demands of the moment, voted in favor of a state-owned company. 
Petrobras was founded in 1953 as a state company with full 
exploration and refining rights in the national territory. New gasoline 
taxes underpinned the corporation’s financial structure. Petrobras 
also benefited from unlimited access to foreign currency and tax-free 
importation of equipment. Despite its newness, Petrobras in the mid-
1950s was better organized and funded than YPF. There was only 
one problem: there was no oil in Brazil, except for some small 
reserves in Bahia, know as the Lobato well. 
 As Smith and Peyerl argued, oil issues provoked extreme 
nationalistic outbursts from even average Brazilians. The idea that a 
country of the size of a continent did not have oil was an insult to the 
conceived notion that Brazil was a land of plenty. (SMITH, 1979, 
P.45) Monteiro Lobato, a famous novelist and failed oil entrepreneur, 
wrote an extremely popular book in the early 1950s arguing that 
Brazil was being sabotaged by the oil majors and their governments. 
In this nationalist climate, Petrobras was severely criticized for 
bringing Walter Link, the chief geologist of Standard Jersey (ESSO), 
to supervise and conduct the survey of the Brazilian sedimentary 
basins. To make matters worse, after five years of research and 
fieldwork and US$ 300 million spent, Link delivered an extremely 
pessimistic assessment about Brazilian oil capabilities. All the major 
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sedimentary basins of the country were surveyed, and none seemed 
promising for major oil exploration. The leaked report triggered a 
predictable nationalist backlash. Link was immediately fired and sent 
out of the country, and the neologism “Linkism” became slang for 
treason in Portuguese during the 1960s. (PEYERL, 2020, P. 54)  
In writing her 1993 work, The Economic Policy of Brazilian Oil, 
Laura Randall drew on unprecedented access to Petrobras archives. 
Unfortunately, this plethora of sources did not materialize in a 
coherent narrative. The topics of Randall’s chapters remain ill-
defined, and her exposition is highly repetitive. But her work is not 
without merits, such as her demonstration that Link was, in fact, 
pivotal to the development of Petrobras. He left behind a structure of 
Brazilian engineers, laboratories and geologists that was extremely 
capable and promising. (RANDALL, 1993: P.68) A Soviet team that 
conducted similar surveys in Brazil, furthermore, confirmed Link’s 
conclusions. As a result, Petrobras itself grew more capable and 
politically influential in the 1950s, despite the dearth of domestic oil.  
 The military proved crucial in forming the ethos of Petrobras 
during this process of consolidation. As Phillip demonstrated, 
Generals Horta Barbosa and Juarez Tavora, serving on the 
company’s board, kept Petrobras insulated from political meddling 
until the 1960s. The generals also helped to develop an impressive 
network of refineries and tankers that only in a few years 
transformed Petrobras into one of the largest employers in Brazil. 
(PHILLIP, 1982: P.329)  
The authors converge in their interpretation of what happened 
to Petrobras with the rise of populism in Brazil during the early 
1960s, embodied by the rise of João Goulart to power in 1961. In 
similar ways to Perón in Argentina, Goulart’s proximity with the 
unions resulted in better wages and benefits to Petrobras’s workers, 
at the expense of Petrobras’s strategic development. As Carvalho 
demonstrates, by 1963 the labor unions virtually ruled Petrobras and 
the military had lost much of its clout. (CARVALHO 1977: P.126) 
Declining influence over Petrobras proved crucial in the path towards 
the military coup of 1964. Immediately following the coup, the military 
emphasized its control over Petrobras, vowing to insulate Petrobras 
from labor pressure while restoring technocracy to primacy. The civil-
military regime’s investment in Petrobras mark the end of the 
consolidation stage of Petrobras and the turn to a more mature 
stage, as Petrobras became a national champion and a player in the 
international oil market.  
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Contemporary Age– Debt Crisis and Neoliberalism  
 
 Elana Shever’s 2012 doctoral dissertation offers a compelling 
account of transformations in the Argentine oil industry over the last 
30 years. Shever explores YPF’s changes after its privatization in 
1993. YPF was plagued by years of political meddling and 
administrative mismanagement. The Ménem administration of the 
1990s, in its effort to reform the Argentine state, followed the dictates 
of the Washington consensus. Ménem privatized not only YPF but 
also Aerolineas Argentinas and other struggling state companies. 
Shever’s narrative demonstrates that YPF’s workers were fired and 
transformed into outsourced contractors. Rather than going to 
archives to analyze that phenomenon, Shiver opted for an 
ethnographic method, allowing her to offer a vivid portrayal of the 
struggles of former YPF employees in adapting to free-market logic. 
Shever portrays this process as a national tragedy, where the forces 
of the international market destroyed Perón’s old YPF family. Her 
perspective is that did not need to happen, since YPF was in her 
eyes a “profitable and efficient company.”(SHEVER, 2012: P.75) 
Unfortunately, Shever adopted an unbalanced view that distorts the 
realities and demands of the oil industry. After seventy years of life, 
YPF was a bankrupt and inefficient company and Argentina was not 
fully self-sufficient in oil. Although its workers had a better standard 
of living and stability that the average Argentine citizen could only 
dream about. With so many regime changes, oil regulation in the 
country was in a state of chaos, where neither the majors nor YPF 
had the edge in the exploration or refining. Moreover, the Argentine 
state was bankrupt and did not have the money to invest in modern 
equipment to fully develop the capacity of the country’s oil fields. In 
the end, privatization seemed the best option to restore YPF to its 
original purpose of being an oil national champion. Shever fails to 
provide documentary evidence proving her allegation that the 
privatization process was marred by irregularities. Shever 
nevertheless provides an acute portrayal of the rebirth of oil 
nationalism in Argentina with the Nestor Kirchner government, 
followed with more verve by his wife and successor Cristina 
Hernandez de Kirchner. Unfortunately there are few sources 
available allowing an in-depth analysis of the Kirchner family with 
Hugo Chavez and PDVSA, and how that influenced the 
renationalization of YPF in 2012. Writing about the present and the 
future is always a daunting task for an intellectual, especially 
because the historical trends are not yet clear. 
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 In Brazil, the contemporary age has brought a remarkable turn of 
events regarding Petrobras. As Carvalho accurately pointed out, the 
military promised a total revamp of Petrobras, making the company 
accountable to improved standards of efficiency.(CARVALHO, 1977: 
P.195) From 1964 until 1977, the military were able to deliver that in 
many ways, but after that the company fell in a morass that marked the 
lowest point of its existence. As Randall argues, during the Debt Crisis 
of the 1980s, the Brazilian government withdrew money from Petrobras 
to pay its debt with the IMF and international creditors. Rumors of 
privatization circulated, particularly in the early 1990s, but, as Randall 
shows, there was little chance of that happening given the nationalistic 
feelings towards oil and Petrobras in Brazil. (RANDALL, 1993: P.142)  
Even during the low years of the 1980s, Petrobras developed 
interests that would emerge in stronger form in its period of renewed 
vigor from the mid-1990s to the present. Former Petrobras engineer, 
Jaime Rotstein, in his work “Petróleo: a crise dos anos 80,”seeks to 
offer broader perspectives on Petrobras’s evolution in that decade. 
He does not entirely succeed in that regard, as his book is weak on 
sources and emphasizes the more outlandish tangents of 
Petrobras’s strategy, such as the proposal that Brazil assemble an 
army to invade the Middle East and force the OPEC nations to lower 
the oil prices, or to cut 50% of crude oil imports to Brazil, 
notwithstanding the consequences to the economy. (ROTSTEIN, 
1980: P.18) Despite these characteristics, exacerbated by his own 
nationalist rants, Rotstein does document some important 
innovations. He shows that the international arm of Petrobras 
(Braspetro) forged partnerships with Iraq, Angola and Mozambique 
in order to guarantee oil sources for cheaper prices. In turn, 
Braspetro developed those fields in a joint venture with those 
countries. The joint venture with Iraq proved to be extremely 
profitable to both sides, causing an interesting Brazilian participation 
in the Iran-Iraq war. The second important trend analyzed by 
Rotstein was the growing use of sugar cane ethanol after the 1973 
oil shock. Ethanol was not the panacea that Rotstein thought it was, 
but it became an important part of the Brazilian energy mix, 
especially after the oil prices rose by the early 2000s.  
It is Smith, however, that notes the most important novelty, the 
discovery of the Campos offshore oil field. Since Smith’s book was 
published in 1979, the only thing that he commented on was that the 
fields were extremely promising. (SMITH, 1979: P.3). About the 
contemporary age of Petrobras, when theexploration of the Campos 
Basin became a reality, the works of Tyler Priest and Bruno Biasetto 
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must be emphasized. Tyler Priest’s book chapter about the history of 
the offshore oil in Brazil in the late 20th century is instrumental to 
demonstrate how Brazil technological strides allowed the country to 
consolidate a complex and efficient operation in the Campos Basin. By 
1997, Petrobras was extracting something close to 1 million barrels per 
day from its operations in the Rio de Janeiro coast, making Brazil self-
sufficient for the first time in its history. (PRIEST, 2016: p.77) Bruno 
Biasetto’s doctoral dissertation The Poisoned Chalice, about the political 
economy of oil in Brazil (1967-2003) compliments Priest’s work in 
interesting ways. His analysis explained why Petrobras improved 
financial situation, following some important corporate reforms in the 
early 1990s, allowed the company to increase its investments in R&D 
and with that expand its operations in the Campos Basin. Biasetto 
analysis sheds light on the fact of how Brazil’s stabilization plan (Plano 
Real) implemented in 1994 was pivotal to improve Petrobras’ fortunes 
by putting inflation under control and creating a strong currency in the 
process. (BIASETTO, 2016: P.275).After thirty years of exploration in 
Campos, Petrobras has become one of the world’s leading companies 
in offshore oil exploration. It achieved that condition in keeping the 
tradition of joint ventures, but now with international companies like 
Halliburton, GALP and Petronas.  
 
Conclusion - Areas for Further Research 
 
Argentina’s oil industry has been better covered than Brazil’s. 
Very few works on Brazil offerr the depth, breadth and evidentiary 
foundation of Gadano’s work on Argentina, for example. Moreover, 
there has to be more relevant research about the sweeping changes 
in Petrobras’s administration after 1993, which helped to transform 
the company into one of the world’s most powerful oil companies. 
Until 2014 Petrobras had a meteoric rise in order to consolidate its 
position as one of the major players in the global oil market. Since 
Brazil’s oil consumption rate soared from 1994 until 2011, it is 
interesting to historians revisit the role of oil in shaping environmental 
damages caused by the oil industry, and how that affects the lives of 
millions of Brazilian citizens. There is also a plethora of possibilities 
regarding the studies of corruption in Petrobras, that is clearly 
evident since the civil-military regime that started in 1964 and that 
still shows signs of being rooted in the company until nowadays.  
Regarding Argentina, the historians have several possibilities 
in researching the details and the repercussion of YPF’s privatization 
in 1993. That process was far from being an honest affair and 
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reflects clearly the serious problems with accountability faced by the 
Argentine state since the return of democracy. Also, a more coherent 
narrative following Gadano’s style could enlighten academics on how 
Argentina conducted its energy policies since 1983. In summary, the 
field is open for those who want to research the rise of Brazil as an 
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